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PREFACE 
The present report will attempt to set forth the 
background for the thinking of st. Thomas Aquinas on econ-
omic problems. The emphasis is on the basic principles of 
Thomistic ethics rather than on the solution to special 
problems of economics. Consequently, the task has been one 
ot exclusion. 
A certain amount of contrast between the present outlook 
on economics and that of st. Thomas has been included. 
In the historical and economic background the writer 
is indebted to the criticisms and suggestions of Professor 
Frank A. Fetter of Princeton. Acknowledgement is also made 
to Dr. Joseph Le Blanc of Loyola for suggestions and 
references to valuable source material. A very special 
acknowledgement is made to Father John McCormick, s. J. for 
his careful criticisms and his inspiration throughout the 
preparation of the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economics, as it is generally understood to-day, is 
considered a social science and it is treated as a distinct 
branch of learning. We must remember, however, that such has 
been the case for only a comparatively short time. Adam 
Smith was probably the first to put economics in a separate 
category and label it as an independent science. Unfortun-
ately it is from him that much ot present day economic 
thinking takes its form. Strange as it may seem, Smith 
himself was a moral philosopher, but by directing most ot 
his attention to the economic activities ot man and by 
departing from the philosophical approach he came to be 
known as the "Father of Modern Economics." Thus, from 1776, 
the date of the publication of Smith's greatest work (1), 
economics has been treated as a distinct branch of learning. 
Prior to that time a study of the economic activity of 
man had not been neglected. (2) On the contrary we find 
that economic problems peculiar to each period had been 
given careful consideration. However, since economic act-
ivities were recognized as human acts - they were treated as 
parts of ethics, they were problems considered by the 
philosophers. Thus it was that st. Thomas Aquinas, who was 
interested in all reality, gave consideration to what we 
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would call to-day the field of economics. The problems of 
that day differed from the problems we have at the present 
in that they were less complex. Likewise, they were not as 
important tor then economic welfare was not considered the 
primary interest of human beings. But, the principles which 
st. Thomas applied to the problems of the thirteenth century 
are worthy of consideration at any time or any period. 
The present investigation will attempt to set forth a 
prolegomena to the economics of st. Thomas. By this is 
meant the background or the basis of the economic thinking of 
St. Thomas. To him economic activity came within the 
category of human acts. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand his general treatment of human acts before 
considering any special kind of human acts. This study will 
attempt to set forth, as the prolegomena to the economics of 
st. Thomas 1) the nature of man and his place in the 
universe; 2) man as a social being; 3) the internal principles 
of man's actions; and 4) the application of these general 
principles to some specific economic problems by st. Thomas. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Nature of Man and His Place 
in the Order of 
the Universe 
In order to understand the economics of st. Thomas it 
is necessary to recognize the place it occupies in the 
Thomistic synthesis. It cannot be considered as a distinct 
and separate branch of learning. At the outset of the Summa 
Theolosica, st. Thomas indicates the scope of his work and 
the relationship of the topics treated: 
"The main purpose of this sacred science is to 
make us acquainted with God, as He is in Him-
self and as the source and goal of things, and 
in a special way of man. We mean to give an 
analysis of this problem, and shall first treat 
of God, secondly of the movement of man toward 
God, and thirdly of Christ, who, as man, is 
our way to God." (3) 
Thus we see that st. Thomas did not confine himself merely 
to a consideration of God but considered at length man•s 
relation to God and man's relation to man. 
From this consideration it is evident why st. Thomas 
did not treat economics as a separate science. Neither would 
he treat politics separately, that is, as independent of 
ethics. Rather, he treated all human acts under ethics for 
there he considered how man should conduct himself in his 
movement toward God. Thus all human acts: social, political, 
and economic were a part of the ethics of st. Thomas. 
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Because of this it is necessary for us to look to the general 
nature of the ethics of st. Thomas. It is on the basis of 
the principles set forth that he considered any economic 
problem. 
If ethics treats of man•s movement toward God our first 
point of enquiry must be in regard to the nature of man. 
Man is something different !rom everything else in the 
universe for he is a union of a spiritual and a material 
entity created by God. According to the principle of order 
first things must be placed first. Therefore, the spiritual 
side of man is of primary importance - everything must be 
subject to it. However, even though the spirit is of primary 
importance it is extrinsically dependent on matter in its 
existence in man. For this reason st. Thomas considers 
material things at some length. Were it not for this extrin-
sic dependence on matter he would have been Justified in 
excluding all such considerations. But, since man is, at 
least in a sense, dependent on matter, material things must 
be considered. Among these considerations we find the 
topics relating to economics. However, as we proceed in 
this study we shall see how st. Thomas' notion of the primacy 
of the spiritual side is kept before us in all considerations. 
A second characteristic of man that must be set forth 
is that he is a self directing being. (4) He is the 
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principle of his actions and has free choice and dominion 
over them. (5) In the ethics of st. Thomas we find a 
consideration of how man chooses in his movements on his way 
to his end. (6) It is assumed in this study, though it may 
be shown clearly in the metaphysics of st. Thomas, that 
there must be a cause of all movement. Now that cause is 
· called an end, and, as is shown below (7) the end is the 
rule of everything that is ordained to the end. Thus all 
movement is toward some end. 'However, the movement of man 
differs and the end of man differs from other things. The 
movement ot the world and of all nature is guided by God 
toward its perfection. (8) But, as has been aaid above, 
man has a freedom of choice in his movements, and, due to 
his nature which is spiritual, his end must be different from 
the end of any material or directed being. Our next point 
of enquiry, then, will concern itself with a determination 
of man's end. However, before looking to what constitutes 
the end of man one point must be made clear. That point is 
that man does not necessarily have freedom of choice in 
regard to all acts. Certain acts are common to all animals. 
But, man, in virtue of his spirituality, has the power of 
reasoning and willing. It is only over the acts which man 
performs as man, or those resulting from reason and will, 
that we may say man has freedom of choice. With regard to 
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these acts then, man must choose in such a way that he may 
arrive at his final or ultimate end. (9) 
. 
In treating this matter st. Thomas says: 
11 We shall consider first the last end of human 
life; and secondly, those things by means of 
which man may advance toward this end, or stray 
from the path: for the end is the rule of what-
ever is ordained to the end. And since the last 
end of human life is stated to be happiness, we 
consider 1) the last end in general 2) happiness." 
(10) 
If man in his human acts, acts reasonably, the question 
arises - as was stated above - as to what end the acts are 
directed. Obviously there are many different accidental 
ends. However, it is clear from St. Thomas• reasoning that: 
"absolutely speaking, it is not possible to 
proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from 
any point of view." (11) 
But just as there is said to be a first cause there must 
also be an ultimate end. He continues to point out that it 
is impossible to go on to infinity in ends, 
"since if there were no last end, nothing would 
be desired nor would any action have its term, 
nor would the attention of the agent be at rest; 
while if there is no first thing among those 
that are ordained to the end, none would begin 
to work at anything and counsel would have no 
term, but would continue indefinitely." (12) 
Of course, just as there may be indeterminate accidental 
causes there may be an infinity of accidental ends. This is 
beside the point when considering the ultimate end. 
If it is true that man always acts for an end and an 
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ultimate end the question presents itself as to whether or 
not there may be several last ends. st. Thomas answers in 
the negative for three reasons: 
"First, because since everything desires its own 
perfection a man desires for his ultimate end, 
that which he desires for his perfect and crowning 
good ••••• It is therefore necessary for the last 
end so to fill man's appetite that nothing is left 
beside it for man to desire." (13) 
Obviously then, the appetite cannot tend to two things as a 
perfect good. Secondly, 
"just as in the process of reasoning, the principle 
is that which is naturally known, so in the process 
of the rational appetite ••••• the principle needs 
to be that which is naturally desired. Now this 
must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing 
only. But the principle in the process of the 
rational appetite is the last end. Therefore, that 
to which the will tends, as to its last end, is 
one. 11 (14) 
And lastly, 
••s iuce voluntary actions receive their species from 
the end ••••• they must needs receive their genus 
from the last end which is common to them all: just 
as natural things are placed in a genus according 
to a common form. Since, then, all things that can 
be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one 
genus, the last end must needs be one." (15) 
Everything that man wills, he wills for the last end, 
and that last end we call happiness. The last end, or happi-
ness, must be something that fulfills the perfection of man.(l6) 
Having come to this conclusion we must next turn to the 
question of what constitutes happiness. Unless it is clear 
where man is going and what he must accomplish in life it is 
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useless to consider the suitability of possible ways of 
acting. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss economic 
problems without having clearly outlined man's objective, 
his goal, his ultimate end. 
There are many apparent goods which some may set up as 
the last end of man - as that which will give happiness. 
Probably one of the most frequently mentioned by practical 
man is wealth. But St. Thomas in company with the other 
philosophers, says that man's happiness cannot consist in 
wealth. His discussion points out that there are two kinds 
of wealth - natural, or that which man uses in satisfying his 
natural wants {food and clothing and the like) ; and artifi-
cial, or that which man uses for convenience in exchange 
{money). 
"Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot 
consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this 
kind is sought for the sake of something else 
••••• consequently it cannot be man's last end, 
rather it is ordained to man as to its end ••••• 
And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought 
save for the sake of natural wealth, Consequently 
much less can it be considered in the light of 
the last end." {17) 
Thus we see that happiness, that which man is striving for, 
cannot be wealth. Since economics is primarily concerned 
with wealth it follows that in a philosophy of lite such as 
that presented by st. Thomas the economic aspects of man's 
activity are necessarily subordinate. Hence economic 
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questions as such are slighted by him and are considered only 
because of their connection with morality. 
In considering other possibilities of things that might 
bring happiness st. Thomas discusses, secondly, whether or 
not honor may bring happiness. Now, honor comes to a man 
by way of his excellence. But, 
"a man's excellence is in proportion, especially, 
to his happiness, which is man's perfect good •••• 
and therefore honor can result from happiness, 
but happiness cannot principally consist therein." 
(18) 
Again, neither fame nor glory can be happiness. Since 
glory consists in being favorably known and praised, it is 
dependent on human knowledge. But, 
tthappiness cannot be caused by human knowledge: 
but rather human knowledge of another's happiness 
proceeds from, and in a fashion, is caused by 
human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect." (19) 
Still others put forth the opinion that happiness con-
sists in power. Again st. Thomas shows this to be impossible 
due to the very nature of happiness as the perfect good. He 
gives two specific reasons why happiness is not power: 
"First because power has the nature of principle •• 
whereas happiness has the nature of last end. 
Secondly, because power has relation to good and 
evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and 
perfect good." (20) 
It is evident, then, that happiness does not consist in 
any of the tour external goods mentioned above for the 
specific reasons stated. st. Thomas also points out tour 
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general reasons why these and similar things cannot mean 
happiness. 
"First, because since happiness is man's supreme 
good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all 
the foregoing can be found both in good and in 
evil men.--secondly, because, since it is the 
nature of happiness to satisfy of itself ••••• 
having gained happiness man cannot lack any 
needful good. But after acquiring any of the 
foregoing man may still lack many goods that are 
necessary to him •••• " (21) 
such material goods as health, and such important things as 
wisdom are still lacking even if the man possesses these 
external goods. 
"Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect 
good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. 
This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is 
written •••• that riches are sometimes kept to the 
hurt of the owner; and the same may be said of 
the other three. Fourthly, because man is 
ordained to happiness through principles that 
are in him; since he is ordained thereto natur-
ally. Now the four goods mentioned above are 
due rather to external causes, and in most cases 
to fortune ••••• Therefore it is evident that 
happiness nowise consists in the foregoing." (22) 
so far in our discussion of the question of happiness 
the treatment has been negative. However, by implication 
we have indicated something of the nature of true happiness 
which is the end of man. st. Thomas in his positive state-
ment on the subject says: 
"Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing 
else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To 
make this clear two points must be observed. First, 
that man is not perfectly happy, so long as some-
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thing remains for him to desire and seek: secondly 
that the perfection of any power is determined by 
the nature of its object." (23) 
Now man•s intellect continually seeks its object which is the 
essence of things. The intellect attains perfection as it 
knows the essence of things. When man knows only the effect 
of some cause that is not sufficient to satisfy the 
intellect for it has a desire to know the cause also. 
"Consequently, tor perfect happiness the intellect 
needs to reach the very ESsence of the First 
cause. And thus it will have its perfection 
through union with God as with that object, in 
which alone man's happiness consists." (24) 
Therefore the final end of man and the goal toward which 
all actions must be directed is union with God through the 
vision of the Divine Essence. I! this is the end of man and 
if man has a freedom of choice in selecting means of attain-
ing that end then man is responsible in selecting his means 
for reaching that end. For this reason man must consider 
carefully the various means that he may choose. All of the 
activities, including economic activities, •hich man exercises 
in pursuing his end--happiness--should be such as would fit 
in with what we call the virtuous life. This form ot life 
alone is suitable for the attainment of this end. In 
Chapter III, the Virtuous life will be considered. 
Today, when economic activity occupies such a place 
of importance it is particularly important for man to recog-
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nize why he chooses and what he must choose. If it is 
possible to keep before man his ultimate end the difficulty 
of seeing the right choice is not so great. Of course this 
difficulty has always existed, - that is why St. Thomas 
placed such emphasis on man•s ultimate end. That is the 
reason why such emphasis is placed on making clear st. 
Thomas• conception of the ultimate end of man in this report. 
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CHAPTER II 
Man as a Social Being 
It has been pointed out that in all nature there is an 
end to be attained and that there are certain directive 
principles helping guide each thing to its proper end. In 
the case of man, st. Thomas points out: 
"The light of reason is placed by nature in 
every man, to guide him in his acts towards 
his end. Were man intended to live alone ••• 
he would require no other guide to his end. 
Then would each man be a king unto himself, 
under God ••••• inasmuch as he would direct 
himself in his acts by the light of reason 
given him from on high. However, it is nat-
ural for man to be a social and political 
animal as the very needs of his nature 
indicate." (25) 
All living things have material needs but the needs of non-
material living beings are supplied by nature. On the 
contrary man has no natural provision for his needs. Instead 
he has been endowed with reason and with it he can direct 
his physical labor to procure what he needs. However, st. 
Thomas points out: 
"one man alone is not able to procure them all 
for himself; for one man could not sufficiently 
provide for life unassisted. It is therefore 
natural that man should live in company with 
his fellows." (26) 
st. Thomas develops other reasons proving that man is by 
nature social, 1. e., that man must have knowledge for human 
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life but no one can have knowledge of all things necessary; 
and that man, through speech, communicates more than any other 
animal. Thus we see that it is natural for man to be a social 
and political animal - to live in a group - for the attain-
ment of his temporal welfare. (27) 
If man is to live in a group there must be some order, 
some government, someone to look after the common good. 
Otherwise the group would soon disintegrate or would not 
accomplish its purpose. st. Thomas uses the analogy of the 
body, that unless there is a general regulating force the 
parts would disintegrate and fail to serve the common good 
of all. (28) As a matter of fact in all nature where a com-
mon end is to be attained by a group there is something 
that rules: 
"Thus in the corporeal universe other bodies 
are regulated, according to a certain order 
of divine providence, by the first body, 
namely the celestial body, and all bodies 
are controlled by a rational creature. So, 
too, in the individual man, the soul rules 
the body; and among the parts of the soul, the 
irascible and concupiscible parts are ruled by 
the reason. Likewise among the members of a 
body, one is the principal and moves all the 
others, as the heart or the head. Therefore, 
in every group there must be some governing 
power." (29) 
It is therefore natural for man to live in a group over 
which there is government. This group so governed consti-
tutes a perfect society,- a family, a city, a state. The 
importance of such society for the temporal welfare is 
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evident from what has been said. When st. Thomas observes 
that "the end is prior in intention but posterior in execution 
(30) he merely states in abstract terms our conclusion that 
the family and state, as means to arrive at an end, must be 
utilized before arriving at that end. The purpose of society 
is to attain the temporal welfare of all its members - to 
provide for their economic, social, and political needs, to 
protect them, and to aid them to the virtuous life. These 
constitute the end of society. The governor of the society 
must not forget that temporal welfare, though the end of 
society, is a means in a finite world to permit men to attain 
an ultimate spiritual end. (31) As the family and state look 
after the temporal welfare of man - the society of God, the 
Church, looks after the spiritual welfare of man. Such 
organizations, then, are taken for granted by St. Thomas as 
a structure in which human acts take place. It is within 
these organizations that st. Thomas visualized economic 
activity and it is within them that he proposed norms for 
such activity. 
St. Thomas laid down the general principles stated 
above showing the importance of organization. At the time 
during which he lived there was another type of organization 
which performed a part of the function that is performed by 
the modern state, i. e., control of economic welfare. That 
organization was known as the guild. The guild was far 
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closer to the individual than the medieval state, and, as such, 
was of the more immediate importance in control. A study of 
the history of the guilds shows an application of many of the 
principles taught by st. Thomas. In the first place they 
were organized to promote the temporal welfare. However, the 
earlier guilds, at least, were very definitely spiritual in 
point of view. For example, one thing that the guilds .in-
sisted upon was the observance of feast days. 
The control exercised by these societies was definitely 
for the common good. Their efforts tended to restrain 
individuals who might try to place selfish ends ahead of the 
general welfare. Not only did the guilds attempt to limit 
avarice and competition but they attempted to consider the 
worker. The master who held full membership intbe guilds 
regulated the hours of labor and set up standards of train-
ing for young men interested in coming into their particular 
field. They tended to protect the consumer through the 
regulation of prices and through setting up standards of 
quality. It may be observed that the notion of just price, 
which will be discussed later, was one of the things the 
guilds sought to establish. 
Thus in the medieval period man, the social being, was 
organized in the Church which looked after his spiritual 
welfare, in the state and the guilds which looked after his 
temporal welfare. The history of Europe during this period 
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and during following periods shows clearly the effect of the 
social control that was exercised. But during this period 
it was something more than organizations that dominated. The 
people did not seek a purely economic rationality in their 
activity. The guilding norms of all activity were what we 
might call to-day extra-economic. These standards were 
religious, moral, and secondarily, political. They tended 
to restrain both private and public activity. In the last 
analysis, the real limiting force was the spirit of the age 
and the ideas and ideals of the people. These exerted them-
selves through the organizations or societies: the church, 
the state, and the guilds. (32) 
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CHAPTER III 
The Internal Principles of Action 
After having discussed briefly the external organization 
of society at the time St. Thomas lived and the importance 
he attached to it, we may turn to the internal principles 
of action which are the foundation and the principal part of 
a normative approach to the social sciences. We may refer to 
the most important of these internal principles as the virtues. 
st. Thomas discusses the meaning and nature of virtue at 
length but for our purposes it is sufficient to note that by 
virtue he means habit of the will of doing good acts, or a 
habit of the will of forming a right disposition in the 
lower faculties. (33) Now it is the virtues which set up 
the virtuous life. The virtuous life, as was pointed out 
at the end of Chapter I, is the life into which all of man•s 
activities, including economic, must fit, if they are to be 
suited to the attainment of the ultimate end. 
The virtues are divided into the intellectual, the 
moral and the theological. Although all are of importance: 
the intellectual if we are to understand the others, the 
moral if we are to have right conduct, and the theological 
if the others are to be perfect; it is the moral virtues 
that we are primarily concerned with in this discussion. 
Going further into the division of the virtues we find that 
-21-
st. Thomas designates four of the moral virtues as the 
cardinal virtues. He reminds us that: 
"We can number things by beginning with their 
formal principles or with their subjects; and in 
either way we·find four cardinal virtues •••••••• 
For there are four subjects of the virtue of 
which we are now speaking: first, reason taken 
in itself, which prudence perfects; then, 1hat 
which only shares reason, and this in its turn 
is subdivided into three kinds: the will which 
is the subject of justice, emotions •••• which 
form the subject of temperance, and (those) 
which form the subject of fortitude." (34) 
Thus we may speak of the four cardinal virtues as prudence, 
justice, temperance and fortitude. All other moral virtues 
tend to revolve about or grow out of these four. 
The virtues are said to be the principles of a good 
life. And, in his consideration of economic problems, St. 
Thomas was concerned with how the good man would meet these 
problems. The good man, then, may be said to be one who 
leads a virtuous life, one who possesses the intellectual, 
the moral, and the theological virtues. The virtues of the 
natural order (the intellectual and moral) are so closely 
interrelated that man must possess them all, at least 
virtually. Of course, the theological virtues are of the 
supernatural order and are infused by God. Hence, we may 
say that there is a hierarchy of virtues. 
Presupposing the lowest of the three virtues the Intel-
lectual, and the first of the moral virtues - that which 
perfects the intellectual - prudence, we may turn our 
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attention to justice which may be said to be superior to all 
other virtues relating to the will for it is the most rat-
ional. St. Thomas points out that: 
"People, strictly speaking, regard as the most 
excellent, that virtue in which the good of 
reason is the most resplendent; and in this 
sense justice excels all other moral virtues, 
as nearest to reason in both its subject and 
object." (35) 
This is true, he further points out, because the subject of 
justice is the will and the will is the rational appetite. 
Again, the object has to do not only with man himself but 
with the operations which are involved in his conduct toward 
other men. Turning to a more detailed consideration of 
justice we find st. Thomas defining it as: 
"a habit whereby man renders to each one his due 
by a constant and perpetual will." (36) 
Emphasis is immediately placed on the notion of perpetual 
for, it is a necessary condition of justice that man wills 
to be just always. 
"For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in 
some particular matter for the time being, be-
cause one could scarcely find a man willing to 
act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite 
that one should have the will to observe just-
ice at all times and in all cases." (37) 
Thus we cannot say that man is practising justice if he is 
just only part of the time. 
The definition of justice given by St. Thomas indicates 
that justice is always toward another. Since 
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"justice by its name implies equality, it denotes 
essentially relation to another, for a thing is 
equal not to itself but to another." (38) 
And, ES we shall show, the rendering to every man his due must 
necessarily imply a form of equality. This is justice 
strictly speaking. It is also possible to use the word 
justice metaphorically when each part of man is ordered 
according to what is becoming to it. 
st. Thomas makes it clear that justice does not mean 
merely knowing what is right. Justice is not aimed at rec-
tifying the intellect or a cognitive faculty. But, 
"since we are said to be just through doing some-
thing aright, and because the proximate principle 
of action is the appetitive power, justice must 
needs be in some appetitive power as its sub-
ject." (39) 
Obviously justice cannot be in the sensitive appetite so it 
must be in the will. Thus, fB was said above, justice is a 
moral virtue rather than an intellectual virtue. 
Having seen something of the nature of justice we may 
proceed to consider in some detail the divisions of justice. 
The most obvious division is into general and particular 
our first point of enquiry is whether justice is general 
virtue. st. Thomas answers this question in the affirmative. 
In~riving at this answer st. Thomas reasons that, in the 
first place justice directs the actions of man with other 
men. Now such activity may be of two kinds. It may pertain 
to individuals or it may pertain to others in general. 
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Justice can direct man's actions in both respects. Con-
tinuing the argument st. Thomas writes: 
"It is evident that all who are included in a community 
stand in relation to that community as parts to 
a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a 
whole, so that whatever is the good of a part 
can be directed to the good of the whole. It 
follows therefore that the good of any virtue, 
whether such virtue directs man in relation to 
himself, or in relation to certain other indiv-
idual persons, is referable to the common good, 
to which justice directs: so that all acts of 
virtue can pertain to justice, insofar as it 
directs man to the common good." ( 40) 
It is the purpose of law to direct to the common good. Thus 
the justice referred to above in the sense of a general 
virtue 
"is called legal justice, because thereby man is 
in harmony with the law which directs the acts of 
all the virtues to thecommongood." (41) 
Obviously, then, we can say that justice is a general virtue, 
and in this sense we may refer to justice as legal justice. 
At later times st. Thomas seems to speak of legal justice 
as being a species of general justice but is probable that 
this use of the word legal is in a different and more part-
icular sense. 
General or legal justice is in a sense the same as all 
virtue, but in another sense it differs from all virtue. 
This may be made clear in the following passage: 
"the name of legal justice can be given to every 
virtue, insofar as every virtue is directed to 
the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, 
which though special essentially is nevertheless 
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virtually generally general. Speaking in this way, 
legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, 
but it differs therefrom logically." (42) 
The second division of justice is that of particular 
justice. That there is need for such a division of justice is 
stated by St. Thomas: 
" •• besides legal justice which directs man immed-
iately to the common good, there is need for other 
virtues to direct him immediately in matters 
relating to particular goods: and these virtues 
may be relative to himself or to another individual 
person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal 
justice there is a need for particular virtues to 
direct man in relation to himself, such as temper-
ance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice 
there is a need for particular justice to direct 
man in his relations to other individuals." (43) 
The matter of justice is, strictly speaking, not internal 
operations or passions but external operations. Measuring 
justice, then differs from measuring other virtues. While 
this will be treated in more detail later when another 
division of justice is considered, we may complete our 
present discussion by referring again to the Summa !heologica 
where St. Thomas declares that: 
"the mean of justice consists in a certain 
proportion of equality between the external 
thing and the external person. Now equality 
is the real mean between greater and less ••• 
wherefore justice observes the real mean."(44) 
Therefore when we say that justice has as its proper act 
rendering to every one his own we mean rendering to each man 
what is his due according to the equality of proportion. 
Thus we conclude our general discussion of justice 
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calling attention to the repeated statement that justice is 
the foremost among the moral virtues. st. Thomas quotes 
freely the earlier philosophers holding this view: 
"Tully says (De Offic. i. 7):Justice is the most 
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name 
to a good man." (45) 
He also quotes Aristotle on the same point who 
"declares (Ethic, v. i) that the most excellent 
of the virtues would seem to be justice, and 
more glorious than either the evening or the 
morning star." (46) 
st. Thomas himself concludes: 
"If we speak of legal justice, it is evident 
that it stands foremost among all the moral 
virtues, for as much as the common good trans-
cends the individual good of one person." (47) 
If we are to have a complete understanding of what st. 
Thomas meant by justice we must turn our attention to his 
discussion of the species of justice. He considers that there 
are two species of justice, distributive and commutative. 
Now particular justice, as spoken of above relates to the 
private individual. The individual may have external acts 
in regard to other individuals and in regard to the community 
as a whole. The order of the first: 
"is directed by commutative justice which is 
concerned about the mutual dealings between two 
persons. In the second place there is the 
order of the whole towards the parts, to which 
corresponds the order of that which belongs to 
the community in relation to each single person. 
This order is directed by distributive justice, 
which distributes common goods proportionately." 
(48) 
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The question now arises of measuring justice when it is 
considered according to species. In regard to distributive 
justice 
"something is given to a private individual, in-
sofar as what belongs to the whole is due to a 
part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to 
the importance of the position of that part in 
respect to the whole." (49) 
Under distributive justice then the more important the person 
is the greater share he receives of the common goods. Thus: 
"in distributive justice the mean is observed, 
not according to equality between thing and thing, 
but according to proportion between things and 
persons ••• Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v •. 
3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows 
geometric proportion, wherein equality depends 
not on quantity but on proportion." (50) 
On the other hand, in commutative justice there is a different 
situation. Here we have a condition where there is an ex-
change of thing and thing. For example in buying and selling 
a person may barter one thing for another or one thing for 
money. In such a case 
"it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, 
so that one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of · 
that which belonged to the other. The result of 
this will be equality according to the arith-
metical mean which is gauged according to the 
equal excess in quantity." (51) 
Thus justice may be seen to apply equality under two aspects 
both of which have a very definite bearing on the economic 
activity of men. Distributive justice has a bearing on all 
matters of organization and on some phases of distribution 
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such as wages. Commutative justice should play a part in the 
whole field of exchange - value and price. 
If we are to have before us the complete picture of the 
virtuous life which was the basis of economic activity we 
must go beyond the field of the philosopher and round out 
our picture by bringing into it the theological virtue char-
ity. It is true that it is possible to discuss the moral 
life strictly speaking without reference to the theological 
virtues but it must be remembered that the theological 
virtues are the conditions for the complete moral life. Since 
our discuasion is more concerned with the exposition of the 
complete moral life in the economic world there is adequate 
justification for borrowing from the field of theology and 
turning our attention to that virtue which is said to keep 
all others in place - charity. 
The definition of charity that we find in st. Thomas 
is that "charity is the friendship of man for God." (52) 
Charity, then is something more than love for not all love 
passes the quality of friendship. In addition to love there 
must be benevolence. More than that, there must be some 
kind of communication. Since 
"there is. a communication between man and God, 
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to 
us, some kind of friendship must needs be based 
on this same communication ••••• the love which 
is based on this communication, is charity."(53) 
From this we may draw an understanding of the extent of 
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friendship. In the first place friendship extends to one's 
friends. Secondly, it extends to someone in respect to 
another. In fact: 
"so much do we love our friends that for their 
sake we love all who belong to them, even if 
they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the 
friendship of charity extends even to our 
enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation 
to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is 
chiefly directed." (54) 
From our point of view it is not necessary to outline 
the proofs showing that charity is supernatural, some added 
form inclining the soul to the act of charity; that charity 
is a virtue which is special and yet is not divided into 
species but is one. These may be assumed but some consider-
ation should be given to the question of the excellence of 
the virtue of charity. Now since the object of the 
theological virtues is God, it is evident that they are more 
excellent than the intellectual and moral virtues. If we 
are to designate any one of the theological virtues as the 
most excellent it will be the one that which attains God 
most. And: 
"that which is of itself always ranks before that 
which is of another. But faith and hope attain 
God indeed insofar as we derive from Him the 
knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, 
whereas charity attains God Himself that it may 
rest in Him, but not that something may accrue 
to us from Him~ Hence charity is more excellent 
than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all 
tbe other virtues." (55) 
It has already been stated above that friendship, which 
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is the basis of charity, extends to all that belongs to a 
friend. We may now come more specifically to the extension 
of charity to our neighhor. "The aspect under which our 
neighbor is to be loved is God, 
"since what we ought to love in our neighbor is 
that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that 
it is specifically the same act whereby we love 
God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Conse-
quently the habit of charity extends not only 
to the love of God, but also the love of our 
neighbor." (56) 
The complete extension of charity may be summarized under the 
four headings of God, our neighbors, our bodies and ourselves. 
Should we wish to take charity in a metaphorical sense we 
may include in its extension everything that canm used for 
God's honor and for the good of man. 
From this general consideration of charity we may pass 
to the order of charity and begin our discussion by deter-
mining whether or not there is order in charity. Order 
means that some things are to be placed before others and 
that things have a proper place. 
"Hence wherever there is a principle, there must 
needs be order of some kind. But ••••• the love of 
charity tends to God as to the principle of happi-
ness, on the fellowship ~f which the friendship 
of charity is based. Consequently there must 
needs be some order in things loved out of charity, 
which order is in reference to the principle of 
that love, which is God." (57) 
In the order of charity the first relationship which 
presents itself to us is the relation of our love of God to 
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our love for a neighbor. Now, 
"Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the object 
in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship 
of which the friendship is based ••• the friendship 
of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, 
which consists essentially in God, as the First 
Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable 
of happiness." (58) 
Thus we ought to love God chiefly and directly because He is 
the cause of our nappiness. On the other hand our neighbors 
are to be loved in a dervided sense as sharing with us the 
happiness from God. Continuing to place things in their 
proper places as sharing in charity, st. Thomas would place 
the love of God before the love of neighbor. Finer grading 
continues placing different kinds of neighbors and relatives 
in their proper places. 
Charity must play a leading role in the moral order 
discussed by St. Thomas. The charity which perfected the 
life of virtue established a fellowship and friendship among 
men which made an ordered economy possible. Therefore, it 
was not a difficult thing to enforce a just price and similar 
customs of the thirteenthmntury. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Some Specific Economic 
Problems 
Treated by St. Thomas 
Man living a virtuous life in an~fort to attain his 
final end, and living in a perfect society - a state - where 
the concern of those governing is the common good, will have 
to carry on activities in order to earn a livelihood. If 
man leads the virtuous life, if the government is good he 
will apply the general principles already discussed. This 
was the view St. Thomas took of economics and so anything 
that we might call Thomistic economics would deal largely 
with applying these general principles to whatever type of 
economic activity that might arise. 
From what has already been said it is evident that st. 
Thomas was not positivistic in his approach to economics. 
His approach was definitely normative for he was concerned 
primarily with the oughtness of the acts. The ordinary 
approach of the economist to-day is exactly the opposite of 
that of st. Thomas. To-day the approach is usually positiv-
istic, frequently it may be institutional, but it is never 
normative. As a matter of fact nearly every writer on the 
subject begins his work with the statement that he is not 
interested in the oughtness of the field of economics but is 
concerned only with what is. (59) A few moments reflection 
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m~{eS it clear why modern economists are not concerned with 
the oughtness of acts. For them the end of economic activity 
is the satisfaction of the material wants of man. They see 
nothing beyond that and have no apparent concern with the 
ultimate end of man which st. Thomas kept constantly before 
him in the consideration of every problem. Thus for St. 
Thomas the primary thing, in fact the only thing he was 
interested in, was the oughtness of the act, or how it would 
aid or hinder man in attaining his last end. 
In order to give a specific notion of how st. Thomas 
approached economic problems we may choose several topics for 
illustration. It must be remembered that since economics 
was not the primary concern of man in the thirteenth century 
st. Thomas did not deal at length with many problems such as 
we have to-day. However, he did discuss those problems which 
were of importance at the time. Economics had not been 
divided into the categories of study that it is to-day, i.e., 
production exchange, and distribution. Consequently he did 
not make a scientific treatment of the different topics. We 
find practically no mention of production in the modern 
sense. The reason is obvious: there was no problem of ought-
ness in production at the time. Regarding exchange we do 
find St. Thomas treating the 'subject. Exchange must be a 
problem whenever men have moved from the most primitive 
stage of economic development. This problem is treated 
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under the subject of the just price or fair rate of exchange. 
Here we find the first indication of the Thomistic method of 
considering the problems in the light of the general principles 
wh1ch had already been considered as necessary for man in 
attaining his last end. 
The modern notion of value is that the rate of exchange 
is entirely a phenomenon of the market; that it is determined 
by the interaction of the two sets of forces known as supply 
and demand; that it is something objective and entirely re-
moved from ethics. On the contrary st. Thomas points out that 
all such activity must serve the common good: 
"Buying and selling seems to be established for 
the common advantage of both parties, one of 
whom requires that which belongs to the other 
and vice versa ••• " (60) 
Regarding the actual aanner of carrying on exchange he points 
out: 
"whatever is established for the common advantage, 
should not be more of a burden to one party than 
to another, and consequently all contracts be-
tween them should observe the equality of thing 
and thing. Again the quality of a thing that 
comes into human use is measured by the price given 
for it, for which purpose money was invented •••• 
therefore, if either the price exceed the quantity 
of the things worth, or, conversely, the thing ex-
ceed the price, there is no longer the quality of justice; and consequently to sell a thing for more 
than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is 
worth is unjust and unlawful. 11 (61) 
In this treatment we see that St. Thomas was concerned solely 
with whether or not the transaction was just. He applies the 
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principles of justice in his solution to the problem of ex-
change and pays no attention to the accidental methods and 
forces that affect exchange. In the above passage it is a 
bit difficult to determine exactly what St. Thomas means by 
the word "worth." The probable meaning is that a certain 
worth is intrinsic in each good. This intrinsic worth would 
depend on the suitableness of the good for man. While it is 
entirely possible that this is what St. Thomas had in mind 
we must not overlook the difficulty of determining the suit-
ableness for different people, since most of these goods are 
only accidental to the livelihood of the people. About the 
only way in which this intrinsic worth can be judged is by 
the common estimate. Thus there seems to be both intrinsic 
worth or suitableness, and the common estimate of that worth. 
The former is something that is entirely foreign to modern 
economic thinking. However, the latter bears a rather close 
resemblance to the modern notion of a social value scale 
which grows out of the concept of utility. 
Exchanges for the common advantage of each party are not 
the only ones which take place. There may be an exchange 
which accidentally tends to the advantage of one party and to 
the disadvantage of the other: 
"for example, when a man has great need of a certain 
thing while another man will suffer if he be without 
it. In such a case the just price will depend not 
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only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the 
sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be 
lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth 
in itself, though the price be not more than it 
is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive 
a great advantage by becoming possessed of the 
other man's property, and the seller be not at a 
loss through being without that thing, the latter 
ought not to raise the price, because of the 
advantage accruing to the buyer. Now no man 
should sell what is not his, though he may charge 
for the loss he suffers." (62) 
Another case in which the buyer pays the seller the ordinary 
price but derives special gain from the transaction presents 
itself. This is the case in which the buyer received what we 
call in current economic terminology a "consumer"s surplus". 
Regarding this st. Thomas says: 
11 the buyer may pay the seller something over the 
above: and this pertains to his honesty." (63) 
In this conclusion we must notice how st. Thomas goes beyond 
strict justice. Though he says that tha payment mentioned 
pertains to the honesty of the buyer it must really depend 
on his charity or his love for his fellow-man. In this one 
article, then, we see how st. Thomas applies both justice and 
charity to a problem that arose in economic activity. It is 
interesting to contrast with this the current notion of 
business men. The common practise to-day is ·to sell for as 
much as one possibly can and to buy for as little as one 
possibly can. In this contrast we find what a vast difference 
results from the seeking of different ends. st. Thomas looked 
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to the ultimate end toward which all activity must be directed, 
while the modern business man looks only to an end that he 
calls business success. 
St. Thomas is not content with applying the principles 
of justice and charity just to the actual exchange. He 
attempts to apply them to the goods exchanged. In beginning 
his discussion of faults that may be in the good that is sold 
he quotes Ambrose who says {De Offic. iii. II): 
"It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good 
man should not depart from the truth, nor inflict 
an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection 
with fraud." {64) 
He then proceeds to show how certain defects in the thing 
sold are really fraudulent. He mentions three defects: first, 
in the substance; second, in the quantity; and third, in the 
quality. If any of these defects exist and the seller con-
ceals ~ the transaction is said to be fraudulent and the 
seller is bound to make restitution. And, the same holds true 
of the buyer, St. Thomas insists. {65) 
Trading, in general, was looked down upon by st. Thomas 
as it was by most of the philosophers. The reason for this 
was that they saw greed inseparably connected with trade. 
Therefore it was not trade itself that they objected to, but 
rather the greed that went with it. St. Thomas will admit 
that if trade is carried on legitimately as a means of attain-
ing man•s last end, it is permissable. In short, if gain is 
incidental to the transaction and not the motive of the 
transaction, it is permissible. As a matter of fact he holds 
that even gain may accrue to the trader if that gain is the 
result of his labor or some service he has performed. (66) 
This concludes the consideration St. Thomas gave to the 
subject of exchange. His approach is clear from the discus-
sion that has been presented. He looked upon buying and 
selling as something that might be necessary to enable man 
to attain the means of reaching his end. However, these means 
must be directed toward the end and in his actions man must 
be good, he must lead the virtuous life, his activities in 
the field must show the effect of justice and charity. 
Another illustration of st. Thomas' treatment of economic 
subjects may serve to make clearer how he applied general 
principles to these problems. Probably a problem which holds 
much present day interest is the problem of usury. Usury has 
been discussed by those who treated of economic topics since 
Aristotle. It is to be expected then that st. Thomas would 
give it consideration. Usury is the charge that was made 
for the lending of money and was the forerunner of our modern 
idea of interest, - though we must be careful not to contuse 
the terms. In his opening consideration of the problem St. 
Thomas says: 
"to take usury for money lent is unjust in itself 
because this is to sell what does not exist, and 
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evidently leads to inequality which is contrary 
to justice." (67) 
Here again there is the specific reference to justice; any-
thing that violates justice is considered wrong. 
st. Thomas continues his discussion of the sin of usury 
by pointing out why it is wrong. He tells us that there are 
certain things the use of which consists in their consumption. 
When dealing with such things the use cannot be separated 
from the thing and if anyone is granted the use ot the thing 
he must be granted the thing itself. Examples cited are 
wheat and wine. One cannot sell wine separate from the use 
of wine. 
"In like manner he commits an injustice who lends 
wipe or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz., 
one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the 
other, the price of the use, which is called 
usury." (68) 
Applying this specifically to money, st. ThGmas refers to 
Aristotle (Ethics v. 5 and Politics i. 3) and points out 
that: 
''money was invented chiefly for the purpose of 
exchange: and consequently the proper and prin-
cipal use of money is its consumption or 
alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence 
it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment 
tor the use of money lent, which payment is known 
as usury." ( 69) 
Payment for the use of money, then, was considered wrong and 
was forbidden. However, under certain conditions compensation 
for something that appears to be similar was permitted. The 
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following passage shows this point: 
"A lender may without sin enter an agreement 
with the borrower for compensation for the loss 
he incurs of something he ought to have, for 
this is not to sell the use of money but to 
avoid a loss." (70) 
Again: 
" ••• he that entrusts his money to a merchant 
or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, 
does not transfer the ownership of his money 
to them, for it remains his, so that at his 
risk the merchants speculate with it, or the 
craftsman uses it for his craft, and conse-
quently he may lawfully demand as something 
belonging to him, part or the profits derived 
from the money." (71) 
While the whole treatment of usury emphasizes again, as 
would the treatment of any problem in economics by st. 
Thomas, the principles of his ethics, it also illustrates 
clearly how circumstances alter the conclusions. The second 
case mentioned above is considered lawful for under the 
conditions there is nothing contrary to either justice or 
charity. But in the former case (69) where there was in-
equality, taking payment for the use of money lent, the 
action was condemned. Without attempting to contrast this 
with the modern view of interest we may conclude that the 
primary point made is that man in his borrowing and lending, 
as in his buying, and in all his acts, ought to practise the 
virtues so that he may attain his end. 
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SUMMARY 
In this report an effort has been made to set forth the 
principles of the philosophy of st. Thomas Aquinas as it has 
reference to the field or economics. 
Since economic activity centers about man the first 
consideration was given to the nature of man and his place in 
the order of the universe. 
Man, according to St. Thomas, is a union of a material 
and a spiritual entity, having as an ultimate end perfect 
happiness. Man differs from all other living beings and from 
all non-living beings in that he has freedom of choice in 
selecting means by which he can arrive at his end. In the 
attainment of that end the spiritual side of man, since it is 
the superior, must dominate and rule the inferior or matter. 
However, in this life, the spiritual entity in man, even 
though it is superior, is extrinsically dependent on matter. 
Consequently there must be some concern over material things. 
Because of this St. Thomas enquires into the problems of the 
material welfare of man. He recognizes that men, in general, 
must live together not only to aid one another in attaining 
their ultimate ends, but also to provide for their material 
welfare. Men living together in a social group form an 
external organization which aids them to attain their end. 
If man is to attain his end of perfect happiness all of 
his activities must be suited to the attainment of that end 
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A life in which all these activities are so suited is called 
the virtuous life. It is the virtues which set up the 
virtuous life. Therefore, consideration must be given to 
the virtues which are said to be the principles of a good 
life. There are three kinds of virtues--intellectual, moral 
and theological. Since this report is limited to a discussion 
of st. Thomas• philosophy as it applies to economics only the 
kind or virtues which apply directly to economic activity 
were considered in detail--Justice and charity. Now justice 
is the habit of rendering to everyone his due. It directs 
man's actions in respect to individuals and in respect to 
others as a whole. A more complete picture or the virtuous 
life as the basis of economic activity must include a dis-
cussion of the Theological virtue of charity. Charity is 
defined as man's friendship for God. This friendship must 
mean a love of God, and by that a love of our neighbors. 
Charity must perfect the life of virtue and establish a 
friendship among men. Obviously, if life is dominated by· 
justice and charity, it is possible to have an ordered 
economy. 
Lastly, some specific economic problems were considered 
in an effort to show the application of these principles. 
The problems of exchange or price illustrates how the general 
principles of st. Thomas' philosophy or life are applied. To 
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st. Thomas any human act must aid man in attaining his end. 
The exchange of goods for economic welfare is a human act and 
consequently must be directed toward man's last end. The 
virtue (the internal principle of action) which must govern 
exchange directly is justice. Thus St. Thomas discusses the 
just price. His sole concern is with the morality of the 
~ct. 
A second illustration was found in his treatment of 
usury, which corresponds in some respects to modern interest. 
It was condemned by St. Thomas. He held that usury was sell-
ing something which did not exist--that is, charging for the 
use of money--and therefore was contrary to justice which 
required an exchange of equals. 
Thus the present report is drawn to a conclusion. Its 
primary purpose was not so much to discuss in detail the 
economics of St. Thomas as to present some of the principles 
of the philosophy of life ot st. Thomas as the basis for his 
economic considerations, and thus present a prolegomena to 
his economics. 
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